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I. INTRODUCTION  
 As the consequences of climate change begin to take effect with impacts such as rising 
sea levels, increased erosion, and increased storm frequency and intensity, coastlines will shift, 
causing a variety of issues for municipalities.  These issues include the conflict between the 
public’s right to access the water and public beaches, and private property owner’s rights to land, 
potentially upsetting the balance of public and private rights.  One possible tool to cope with this 
problem is the implementation by states and municipalities of rolling easements, which are 
either:  
1.[a] [r]egulation or an interest in land in which a property owner’s 
interest in preventing real estate from eroding or being submerged 
yields to the public or environmental interest in allowing wetlands, 
beaches, or access along the shore to migrate inland[; or] 2. An 
interest in land along the shore whose inland boundary migrates 
inland as the shore erodes.
1
  
 
The theory of rolling easements posits that the best way to combat rising seas is not to combat 
them at all, but, instead, allow them to move inland and adjust structures, property interests, etc., 
accordingly.
2
  This memorandum will explore whether rolling easements are a viable solution for 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Maine in managing the impending consequences of climate 
change.  First, this memo will discuss the public trust doctrine and each state’s duty to protect its 
citizens’ right to access the water.  Second, this memo will explore what rolling easements are 
and how they can be implemented. Third, this memo will discuss Maine, Massachusetts, and 
Connecticut’s interpretation of how the public trust doctrine and rolling easements relate.  
Fourth, this memo will explore whether or not rolling easements rise to the level of a government 
                                                 
1
   James Titus, Rolling Easements 8 (Climate Ready Estuaries EPA Program ed., 2011).   
2
   Id. at 10. 
4 
 
taking.  Lastly, this memo will examine a specific court case from Texas, Severance v. Patterson, 
and what its decision means for the future of rolling easements.  
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 A.  THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE  
The public trust doctrine establishes a fiduciary duty of the state, or government, as 
trustee, to the public regarding the public right to access water resources and preserve tidelands 
in their natural state.
3
  As sea levels rise, the public’s access rights, protected by the public trust, 
may conflict with those of private property owners, and states will be in danger of breaching 
their fiduciary duties to the public. 
Consequences of climate change have already begun to take effect; one example is 
increased erosion, causing shoreline armoring in some places, and the resulting the loss of public 
beaches.
4
  When formerly public beaches are submerged and the only access points left are on 
private land, a conflict can arise regarding private and public property rights and the state’s 
fiduciary duty to the public.
5
  The private land owners risk losing, at worst, their land to the sea, 
and at best their right to develop a portion of their land and exclude others from it.  The public 
risks losing its right to access the water (e.g. for recreational activities, for employment purposes, 
etc.) and the state risks liability for breaching its fiduciary duty to its citizens.   
James Titus, a recognized scholar on the public trust doctrine, posits three ways to limit 
the issue of too much, and unnecessary, shore protection: 
                                                 
3
   Kate Kramer, Coastal Preservation and Transferred Development Rights, 1-2, (December 17, 2010) available at  
http://law.rwu.edu/sites/law/files/rwu/MarineAffairs/pdf/Kramer-
MACZM%20TDR%20Memo%20Final%2001%2011.pdf .  
4
 Id. at 2. 
5
 Id.  
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1. Setbacks. Prevent development of some lands vulnerable to sea 
level rise, either through regulation or by purchasing land (or 
development rights) from the current owners. 
2. Rolling easements. Make no effort to restrict land use but 
prevent shore protection of some coastal lands either through 
regulation or by transferring any right to hold back the sea from 
owners inclined to do so to organizations that would not. 
3. Laissez-faire. Make no effort to prevent either development or 
shore protection, but curtail government subsidies for both, and 
hope that eventually the forces of nature and economics will lead 
owners to allow their lands to be submerged.
6
 
 
The theory of rolling easements combines setbacks with Laissez Faire, enabling the property 
owner to maximize the value of the property through development, while knowing that when sea 
levels rise the land will convert into a wetland or beach as if it had never been developed.
7
 
 
  B.  ROLLING EASEMENTS 
   I.  WHAT ROLLING EASEMENTS CAN ACCOMPLISH 
 Some of the objectives that rolling easements address include the preservation of beaches 
and the waterfront, the preservation of public access along the shore, the facilitation of landward 
relocation of roads and other structures, and enabling wetlands to migrate inland.
8
  There are 
occurrences of shoreline armoring and protection resulting in beaches being entirely eliminated, 
even at low tide; in some instances public access points have been eradicated as well.
9
  To 
prevent these impacts from continuing to occur, rolling easements may call for: 
No shoreline armoring; A rolling design boundary (e.g. dune 
vegetation line), seaward of which the owner’s property rights are 
reduced; No new structures seaward of the rolling design 
boundary; Encouragement or requirement to remove preexisting 
structures when erosion leaves them seaward of the rolling design 
boundary; Warnings about the policy to prospective buyers of 
                                                 
6
 Titus, supra note 1 at 4.   
7
 Id. at 5.   
8
 Id. at 13.   
9
 Id.    
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coastal property; Provisions for public access []; and Indication 
whether beach nourishment and adding sand to dunes are 
allowed.
10
  
 
The requirements of rolling easements can be as static or flexible as a state or municipality 
determines best for its jurisdiction.  However, a key feature of rolling easements is the 
prohibition of shoreline armoring, preserving public access to the shore.
11
   
 Preserving public access is only necessary if there is something for the public left to 
access.  Assuming shoreline armoring has been prohibited and there is still a beach, although 
further inland than it originally was, the public trust doctrine will kick in and, depending on the 
state, the public will have a right to access the beach from the mean high water line or the mean 
low water line seaward.
12
  This means that if private land borders the public beach, as the 
shoreline moves inland, what was once private property will become the public’s right to access.  
This is the greatest point of contention with the theory of rolling easements, in part due to the 
law of avulsion.
13
  Some courts have determined that littoral owners possess the same rights to 
lands they had a right to prior to the sudden loss of land, but this can be resolved through 
agreements with and cooperation of the private property owners, possibly through the Transfer of 
Development Rights (TDRs) or compensation (which will be addressed later in this memo).
14
   
 
                                                 
10
 Id.  
11
 Id. at 3, 14 (Shoreline Armoring: “protect[s] development with structures such as dikes, seawalls, and bulkheads. 
This approach maintains existing land use, but can increase the loss of wetlands and beaches. It can also eliminate 
public access along the shore”). 
12
 Titus, supra, note 1 at 19. 
13
 See id. at 20 (Avulsion is a sudden detachment or separation.  “When the shoreline migrates suddenly, by contrast, 
the property line does not move, under the ‘law of avulsion.’ Although somewhat counterintuitive, courts treat 
avulsion and accretion differently for several reasons. Originally all lands had fixed boundaries, so when large areas 
of land suddenly appeared over what had been water, early courts had little reason to change the rule that what had 
been the King’s water was now the King’s land. When the state fills a body of water to create land, the state owns 
that land under the law of avulsion, although there may be provisions to ensure that the littoral landowner continues 
to have access to the water. The courts in some states, however, view the new land as an artificial accretion and 
award it to the waterfront landowner. Another example of avulsion would be a river changing course or the sudden 
creation of an inlet through a barrier island.”). 
14
 Id.  
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   II.  HOW ROLLING EASEMENTS CAN BE IMPLEMENTED  
 Rolling easements can be implemented in a variety of ways, including: regulation, 
interests in land, combinations of rolling easements, and through combinations with other coastal 
policies.
15
   
 One way a municipality can achieve rolling easements through regulation is by amending 
zoning ordinances.
16
  This can be accomplished in a variety of ways.  Amendments may include 
the following: splitting the rural estate zone into two zones, rural estate protect (REP) and rural 
estate retreat (RER); splitting the residential single family zone into two zones, residential single-
family protection (RSP) and residential single-family accommodation (RSA); amending the 
zoning ordinance to add “shore protection structures” and “increases in land elevation grades” to 
the list of prohibited activities for zones agricultural, open space/ conservation, and rural estate 
retreat (for further detail on this see Rolling Easements by James Titus).
17
   
 Additionally, interests in land can be employed in a variety of ways to realize rolling 
easements, including covenants, defeasible estates and future interests, conservation easements, 
and ambulatory boundaries.
18
  Covenants, defeasible estates, and future interests are useful 
devices that local governments could require developers to include in deeds as they sell property 
to private individuals.  For example, “[c]onsider a deed that says that the developer is granting 
the land to the buyer ‘for as long as it takes sea level to rise 4 feet above the level that prevailed 
in the 1980–2001 tidal epoch.’”19  Furthermore, rolling easements can be established via 
                                                 
15
 Id. at iv. 
16
 Id. at 88 (Where, for example, in VA a “statute authorizes zoning ordinances ‘to provide for… safety from 
flood….for the preservation of agricultural and forest lands and other lands of significance for the protection of the 
natural environment.’ Any locality can create zones and regulate ‘the use of land, buildings, structures, and other 
premises for agricultural, business, industrial, residential, flood plain and other specific uses.’ Zoning ordinances 
must include ‘adequate provisions for drainage and flood control.’”). 
17
 Titus, supra note 1 at 42. 
18
 Id.  
19
 Id. at 55.  
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ambulatory boundaries, where private property owners voluntarily agree to recognize that 
boundaries will migrate with the shifting shore.
20
  
There are five combinations of rolling easements that are theorized by Titus:  
rolling easement zoning of land that is already subject to recorded rolling easements; 
rolling easement zoning of land subject to federal or state regulations that discourage 
shore protection; recorded rolling easements on land already subject to restrictive zoning; 
covenants on subdivided parcels of land where a developer has already conveyed a 
rolling easement on the entire development; and a combination of a conservation 
easement with a possibility of reverter. 
 
Each is described in-depth in Rolling Easements.
21
  
  C. THE STATE’S DUTY AND ROLLING EASEMENTS 
   I.  MAINE 
Massachusetts and Maine’s public trust grew out of the same common law heritage, as Maine 
was once a part of the Massachusetts Bay Colony.
22
  Together their doctrines are among the most 
restrictive of public rights, granting ownership, subject to conditions, to the intertidal lands to the 
private property owner.
23
 
During the mid-19th Century the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that the upland 
owner's “title to the shore [is] as ample as to the upland” and again reiterated, with conditions, at 
the turn of the 20th Century in Marshall v. Walker, where the court held that “the proprietor of 
the main holds the shore ... in fee, like other lands, subject, however, to the jus publicum, the 
right of the public to use it for the purposes of navigation and of fishery.”24  Thus in the state of 
Maine, the upland property owner owns the intertidal land in fee simple subject to conditions, as 
distinguished from the majority of states where the upland property owner owns from the mean 
                                                 
20
 Id. at 58. 
21
 Id. at 62.   
22
 See http://www.mass.gov/czm/oceanmanagement/waves_of_change/pdf/trpt.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2012). 
23
 Id.   
24
 State v. Wilson, 42 Me. 9, 28 (1856); Marshall v. Walker, 93 Me. 532, 45 A. 498 (1900). 
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high water line upland in fee simple.
25
  Regarding intertidal land and more specifically flats, it 
has been established, through case law, that the public has “the right of navigation” which 
includes the mooring of vessels, and the discharging and taking in of cargoes, provided the flats 
are unoccupied.
26
  In addition, members of the public are permitted to make such uses of the 
privately owned flats “[i]n the pursuit of [their] private affairs, of business as well as pleasure.”27  
However, the court held that the “removal of six gondola loads of mussel-bed manure,” the 
taking of seaweed, or the deposit of ice by the public is not permissible or protected by the public 
trust.
28
  The two most recent cases to explore Maine’s Public Trust are Bell v. Town of Wells and 
McGarvey v. Whittredge.  In Bell, the court held that there was a “legally sufficient basis for 
recognizing limited public recreational rights in the Maine seashore” and in McGarvey it was 
established that “The public may engage in activities in intertidal lands that are not directly 
related to fishing, fowling, or navigation,” specifically, scuba diving.29  Although, in recent years 
the court has recognized the public’s right to activities other than fishing, fowling, and 
navigation in intertidal lands, Maine’s public trust doctrine is still much narrower than the 
overwhelming majority of states and tends to favor the rights of private property owners over the 
public’s right of access.   
    A.  TDRS IN MAINE 
In preparation of rising tides, Maine “sharply restricts new hard shore protection structures 
along the ocean shores and within the dunes, but allow them along estuaries” and “explicitly 
                                                 
25
 Wilson at 28; Walker at 498.   
26
 Andrews v. King, 124 Me. 361, 129 A. 298, 299 (1925). 
27
 Id. 
28
 See, Moore v. Griffin, 22 Me. 350, 352 (1843)(where the court held, “[n]either the ordinance nor the common law 
would authorize the taking of ‘muscle-bed (sic) manure’ from the land of another person”); Hill v. Lord, 48 Me. 83, 
92 (1861);  McFadden v. Haynes and DeWitt Ice Co., 86 Me. 319, 29 A. 1068 (1894) (where the court held, the 
defendant ice company, a member of the public, had no right to deposit snow upon the plaintiff's flats between high 
and low watermark).   
29
 McGarvey v. Whittredge, 28 A.3d 620 (Me. 2011); Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 192 (Me. 1989) . 
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contemplates ecosystem migration in [its] regulations for some areas where structural shore 
protection is prohibited.”30  Additionally, Maine has adopted TDRs by statute under § 4328 
Transfer of Development Rights, which reads: 
In order to comply with the requirement in section 4326 for each 
municipality to adopt land use policies and ordinances to 
discourage incompatible development, a municipality may adopt a 
transfer of development rights program for the transfer of 
development rights within its boundaries. Two or more 
municipalities may adopt a program that provides for the transfer 
of development rights between the municipalities if the 
municipalities have entered into an interlocal agreement pursuant 
to chapter 115 for this purpose.
31
   
 
Although TDRs are part of Maine’s statutory scheme they have not been widely successful.  
Brunswick adopted a TDR program in 1986 in hopes of preserving “land for recreation, 
conservation and protection of water quality, natural features and historical resources,” however 
the program was never used and the town eliminated the provisions in 1997 when it adopted a 
new zoning ordinance.
32
  Like Brunswick, the TDR program in Cape Elizabeth, Maine was a 
complete failed attempt, and no transaction occurred in either municipality.
33
  It is likely that 
both program failed due to the following,  
Brunswick designated a single, undeveloped property as a 
receiving area that lacked sewer and water, and failed to specify on 
a map a designated sending area. Cape Elizabeth did not provide 
adequate incentives or compensation to induce landowners to 
sell development rights, compared to the profit that could 
otherwise be gained through subdivision and build out.
34
 
 
There are still currently two towns in Maine that have TDR programs, New Gloucester (TDR 
Program only became official in February 2005), and Scarborough.
35
  Due to the short period of 
                                                 
30
 Titus, supra note 1 at 46.  
31
 Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 30-A, § 4328. 
32
 Smart Preservation: Brunswick, ME available at http://smartpreservation.net/brunswick-maine. 
33
 Transferable Development Right, 3, available at 
http://www.maine.gov/doc/commissioner/landuse/docs/techassist/transferofdevelopmentrightsrintro.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 17, 2012).   
34
 Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
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time that these programs have been in place there is little information available regarding their 
success of lack thereof.  However, Maine’s Department of Conservation has compiled a list of 
necessary factors for viable and successful TDR programs, which include, development pressure 
and market demand, adequate incentives, market acumen and periodic program review, a well-
conceived preservation plan at the sending end, a well-conceived plan to guide development at 
the receiving end, highly-qualified consultants, extensive record-keeping capabilities, political 
leadership, public education and community support, and a mix of complementary tools and land 
use planning techniques.
36
  It is likely that the reason why the Brunswick TDR program was 
unsuccessful was due to the fact that several, if not all of the “success and viability” factors listed 
above, were not adequately met.   
 Considering Maine’s restrictive interpretation of the public trust doctrine and its current 
lack of success, in practice, with TDR programs, it would appear that the implementation of 
rolling easements might fail as well.  However, the adoption of TDRs by statute and the sharp 
restrictions on new hard shore protections are strong indicators that addressing the consequences 
of climate change and developing viable solutions to them are a priority of citizens and 
government actors alike.  Taking into account the failures of various regulatory programs that 
were put in place throughout the country, it is likely that Maine will have to gain the cooperation 
of its private waterfront property owners, if it wants to guarantee successful rolling easement 
programs, for example, through a combination of rolling easements and TDRs, so that property 
owners will not completely lose out on the exchange.   
   II.  MASSACHUSETTS 
                                                                                                                                                             
35
 Smart Preservation: Cape Elizabeth, ME, http://smartpreservation.net/cape-elizabeth-maine (last visited Dec. 17, 
2012).   
36
 Transferable Development Right, supra note 33, at 3-4.   
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Massachusetts, like Maine, is in the minority of states that give expanded rights to the private 
property owner and limit the public’s use of intertidal lands.37  The upland property owner has 
fee simple interest in the intertidal land, subject to certain limitations, including the public’s right 
to navigate, swim, fish, fowl, however, the public does not have the right to bathe in intertidal 
waters.
38
  Massachusetts joins DE, ME, NH, PA, VA, in the minority that vest from the mean 
low tide line upland in fee simple to the private property owner, this means the intertidal lands 
are deemed private property, subject to the limitations mentioned above.
39
  Because this 
intertidal land is not held in trust for the public by the state of Massachusetts and the upland 
owner has a fee simple interest in it, gaining the private property owner’s cooperation in order to 
preserve the public’s access to the ocean is very important.  There have been numerous court 
decisions that have struck down regulatory implementation of rolling easements without gaining 
cooperation of or giving compensation to the private property owners.   
    A.  TDRS IN MASSACHUSETTS 
Like Maine, Massachusetts already has a plan for TDRs under its Smart Growth Alliance 
Program, and several towns have wetland protection rules that “prohibit both shore protection 
structures and grade elevation within 50 feet of the shore, with the explicit purpose of ensuring 
that wetlands and beaches migrate inland as sea levels rise.”40  
Smart growth’s vision, “promotes healthy and diverse communities, protects critical 
environmental resources and working landscapes, advocates for housing and transportation 
choices, and supports equitable community development and urban reinvestment.”41  As the first 
                                                 
37
 Id.   
38
 McGarvey at 620; Butler v. Attorney Gen., 195 Mass. 79, 80 N.E. 688 (1907). 
39
 See http://www.accessingthemainecoast.com/common_law_and_statutes/common_law_and_statutes.shtml#A1 
(last visited Dec. 17, 2012). 
40
 Titus, supra note 1 at 50. 
41
 Smart Growth, http://www.mass.gov/envir/smart_growth_toolkit/pages/intro-to-SG.html (last visited Dec. 17, 
2012). 
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municipality in Massachusetts to promulgate a TDR program, Falmouth, distinguished itself 
from its counterpart in Brunswick, Maine by utilizing TDRs, successfully, three times preserving 
15 to 20 acres in the process.
42
  It is likely that Falmouth’s success is due to the fact that its 
receiving districts were properly equipped to handle development (e.g. the property owners who 
were forfeiting development rights could actually develop the land they were transferred, unlike 
the failed TDR attempts in Maine) and the sending districts were suitably fitted with a covenant 
once the TDR was set in motion.
43
  Although this particular case study dealt with the 
preservation of water resources and not the public’s right to access water or property rights, the 
fact that the program has been successfully used bodes well for a potential pairing with rolling 
easements in an effort to preserve the public trust doctrine.  In addition to Falmouth, the 
following Massachusetts municipalities have proposed TDR programs: Acton, Cambridge, 
Carver, Easthampton, Groton, Hadley, Hatfield, Northampton, Palmer, Plymouth, Sunderland, 
Townsend, Westborough, and Westfield.
44
  These programs have been proposed or implemented 
quite recently and therefore, there is little to no information regarding their progress and their 
success cannot be gauged as of yet.   
                                                 
42
  Smart Preservation: Falmouth, MA, available at http://smartpreservation.net/falmouth-massachusetts (last visited 
Dec. 17, 2012). 
43
 See id. (where “Sending areas in the Falmouth program… known as donor districts. Eligible donor sites include 
land within Water Resource Protection and Coastal Pond Overlay Districts… Donor lots…compl[ied] with the 
minimum requirements for a building permit or be determined potentially sub-dividable by the Planning Board 
given minimum zoning requirements, subdivision regulations and other pertinent code provisions Receiving districts 
consist of land currently zoned B3, B2, LIA, RC, RB, AGB, RA, AGA, RAA and AGAA. However, receiving sites 
cannot be located within a mapped Water Resource Protection District, a mapped coastal pond recharge area or an 
area that qualifies as a TDR donor district. Receiving sites must be at least five acres in size if located within the 
RA, RB, RC, AGA or AGB zones. Receiving areas in the AGAA or RAA zones must be at least 10 acres in size and 
receiving areas in the Business or LLA zones must be at least two acres in size. Town-owned land can serve as 
either donor or receiving sites if approved for that purpose by a two-thirds vote of the Town Meeting.  The Planning 
Board approves TDR transfers in conjunction with receiving subdivision and special permit applications. The 
density bonus allowed on receiving sites varies depending on the zoning of the donor site. For example, a receiving 
site zoned RB could receive 1.4 credits from a donor site zoned RC but 1.3 credits from a donor site zoned AGB. In 
approving a transfer, the Planning Board may also allow minimum frontage, lot width and area standards to be 
reduced.”). 
44
 See Smart Preservation, available at  http://smartpreservation.net/tdr-updates. 
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Although TDRs have only been successfully applied in Falmouth and the current program 
does not provide for rolling easements, in Rolling Easements, Titus posits a plan where the two 
can be used in conjunction with each other.   This pairing may help to insure that the 
preservation efforts of public rights are not challenged as takings.
45
  Although Massachusetts has 
a fairly restrictive interpretation of the public trust doctrine, the fact that it has TDR programs 
already in place makes the implementation and success of rolling easements that much more 
likely.  
   III.  CONNECTICUT 
Connecticut follows the majority view of the public trust doctrine and its interpretation is 
much more expansive than Massachusetts and Maine.  The coastal property owner has fee simple 
interest from the mean high waterline upland, while the state retains interest in the intertidal land, 
which it holds in trust for the public where the state, as representative of the public, is owner of 
soil between high and low watermark on navigable water where the tide “ebbs and flows.”46  
Furthermore, the court in Bloom v. Water Res. Comm'n went on to say that common-law riparian 
rights are subject to reasonable police regulation in the interest of the public welfare and have 
been held subject to such regulation for many years.
47
  Although it may seem obvious that 
riparian rights would be subject to police regulation, it is important that the court specifically 
made note of this in its decision as it is a further recognition of the public’s rights pertaining to 
access of the waterfront and Connecticut’s expansive view of the public trust doctrine. 
    A.  CONNECTICUT AND TDRS 
                                                 
45
 Titus, supra, note 1 at 62.   
46
 See Bloom v. Water Res. Comm'n, 157 Conn. 528, 254 A.2d 884 (1969). 
47
 Id. at 888. 
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Like Massachusetts, Connecticut has TDR programs in place that could be complimented 
by rolling easements.  Connecticut’s TDR program, the oldest discussed in this memo, was first 
implemented by the town of Windsor:  
In 1976, Windsor adopted a transfer of residential density program which allows 
flexibility in residential density in order to ensure that residential development is 
appropriately located in relation to transportation, community facilities and other 
services. In 1993, the Town also created a separate non-residential TDR program in an 
effort to preserve land with historic, ecologic, aesthetic, agricultural or recreational 
resources.
48
   
 
Since its promulgation, Windsor has only received one application for TDR, and it was denied, 
in large part because of the town’s Economic Development Commission’s recommendation to do 
so “because the proposed receiving area was in an industrial zone…[and] the proposal would be 
a detrimental reduction in the Township’s inventory of industrial land.”49  However, after the 
decision, Town Planner Mario Zavarella, stated that the Town has since acknowledged there is 
actually too much land zoned for industrial purposes.
50
  After the denial of the first application, 
there were no further applications, causing some to speculate that the denial had a chilling effect 
on future proposals, and the possibility that the one-to-one transfer ratio was inadequate 
compensation.
51
  Despite the issues Windsor has experienced with residential TDRs, in 2001 the 
town planner, Mario Zavarella, reported that the town had been more successful with the non-
residential TDR program, receiving almost 13 acres of open space land in critical locations.
52
  
Additionally, the town of Hebron, Connecticut has implemented a TDR program with a one to 
                                                 
48
 Smart Preservation: Windsor, CT available at http://smartpreservation.net/windsor-connecticut.   
49
 Id.   
50
 Id.   
51
 Id. 
52
 Id. 
16 
 
one transfer ratio, but there is no information regarding its status as of yet, likely due to the short 
period of time it has been in place.
53
 
 
 D. THE ROLE OF TAKINGS IN ROLLING EASEMENTS AND TDRS 
 A significant issue surrounding rolling easements and TDRs is whether or not they rise to 
the level of a government taking.  The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, states 
that a taking occurs if the government’s actual or effective acquisition of private property occurs 
without just compensation to the landowner.
54
  TDRs do not rise to the level of a taking because 
the owners of the private land are compensated for their property right, however the concept of 
rolling easements is not as cut and dry.  The major issue that needs to be resolved is whether or 
not the property owner has the right to hold back the sea.  Only a few states have specifically 
explored this question, and although one of the cases took place in Massachusetts, the court 
“fail[ed] to rule on the underlying takings claim when homes in Chatham were lost due to 
government delays in [a] decision on permit for revetment.”55  If the property owner does have 
the right to hold back the sea, then rolling easements constitute a taking per se, due to the 
presence of a permanent physical invasion, and if the owner does not have that right, then a 
rolling easement would not constitute a taking per se, but an ad hoc test would still have to be 
explored.
56
  In the seminal case Penn Central Transportation Co. v. NYC, the court established 
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 U.S. Const. amend. V. 
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 Wilson v. Commonwealth, 597 N.E. 2d 43 (Mass. App. 1992). 
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the ad hoc test that is used in current takings analyses.
57
  The ad hoc test requires that any 
economic impacts, investment backed expectations, and the character of the government action 
be taken into account and balanced in determining if a taking has occurred.
58
  The ad hoc test 
requires an analysis of the factors specific to each, individualized case.  This is so because 
property value and the ability to develop varies greatly from parcel to parcel, and each property 
owner is likely to have differing investment backed expectations, if any; however, the character 
of the government activity will likely always be the same, or at least similar, to preserve 
ecological interests, and the public’s right to access the water.  If rolling easements are paired 
with TDRs it is unlikely that a court will find a taking has occurred because the private land 
owner will be compensated for giving up his or her development rights of the easement area.   
 In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the court held that the rolling easement 
provision of the South Carolina Beach Front Management Act of 1988 amounted to a 
government taking.  Prior to the passage of the Act, Lucas owned a parcel of ocean front land 
that he planned to develop, the Act was then passed making Lucas’ land undevelopable, and 
thus, according to the majority, depriving him of one hundred percent of his property value 
which was tantamount to a regulatory taking.
59
  Here, the majority’s decision clearly favors the 
rights of the private property owner and is exceedingly wary of government overreaching via 
regulation.  However, it is also important to note the dissent, where Stevens contemplates 
whether or not there has been a complete deprivation of property, “because of the elastic nature 
of property rights, the Court's new rule will also prove unsound in practice.”60  If the government 
                                                                                                                                                             
property did not make it simply a regulation of use of real property; and (4) statute could not be construed as merely 
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1992). 
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had compensated Lucas in some way for his property, for example, by exchanging development 
rights in another portion of the municipality for the “easement” it is unlikely a taking would have 
been found. 
 
 E.  SEVERANCE V. PATTERSON AND ITS LIKELY EFFECT ON ROLLING EASEMENTS 
AND TDRS  
Prior to the decision in Severance v. Patterson, most of the sources on rolling easements 
pointed to Texas common law as recognizing rolling easements, however, since the decision in 
June of 2012 that is no longer entirely true.  The central debate in the Severance case was a 
challenge to the Texas Open Beaches Act, which imposed a public beach access easement on all 
property up to the natural vegetation line, regardless of whether or not the public had ever used 
the property.
61
  In the wake of Hurricane Rita the beaches in Galveston Texas experienced severe 
erosion pushing back the vegetation line in certain areas.  This was the case with Carol 
Severance’s property, and in 2006, she received letters informing her that because her homes 
were now seaward of the vegetation line they were now on the public beach and in violation of 
the Open Beaches Act, therefore she could not exclude the public and she was prohibited from 
developing the land any further.  The Supreme Court of Texas decided this issue very narrowly 
holding that, “[a]lthough existing public easements in the dry beach of Galveston’s West Beach 
are dynamic, as natural forces cause the vegetation and the mean high tide lines to move 
gradually and imperceptibly, these easements do not spring or roll landward to encumber other 
parts of the parcel or new parcels as a result of avulsive events.”62  Due to the narrow holding in 
                                                 
61
 Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 713 (Tex. 2012). 
62
 Id. at 45.   
19 
 
this case, rolling easements may still be recognized in other parts of Texas, just not along 
Galveston’s West Beach.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
 Regardless of what approach is taken, it is undeniable that both states and municipalities 
need to create plans to combat the effects of climate change and rising sea levels that will be 
effective in practice.  Although there are a variety of ways to minimize the effects of rising sea 
levels, it seems that if a state wishes to use rolling easements and/ or transferred development 
rights programs successfully it is important to have the cooperation of the private property 
owner, or at the very least to provide compensation for the lost rights of exclusion and 
development.   
